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RESEARCH NOTE 
Low pay and industrial relations: the case 
of contract cleaning 
Peter Brosnan* and Frank Wilkinson** 
A key feature of the present government's economic strategy has been to directly, and 
indirectly, undermine pay and conditions of employment. Unemployment, although an 
inevitable by-product of the government's industrial and monetary-fiscal policies, has been 
blamed on the wage fixing system and on the levels of pay. In tum, the government and 
employer interests have been able to use the growth of unemployment as a legitimization 
of their attacks on the pay fixing system and the level of pay. Real wages, both gross and 
net, are now lower on average than when the present government was first elected in 1984 
and the thrust of current government policy is to lower them further. This decline in real 
gross wages has been far from evenly shared. While the lowest quintile of wage earners 
experienced a fall in real income of 3.5 percent between September 1984 and the end of 
1987, the top quintile experienced an increase of 1.1 percent. Real net wages for the 
lowest quintile fell by 0.4 percent while those of the top quintile rose 4.5 percent 
(Brosnan and Wilkinson, 1989, Table 2). 
The continual reduction of wages at the lower levels is justified by the government and 
its advisers as producing more flexibility and ensuring the survival of marginal firms. 
The Treasury, perhaps the strongest proponent of lowering pay at the lower levels, has 
even gone so far as to recommend that the Minimum Wage Act be repealed. We have 
argued elsewhere that these arguments are fallacious and that a decent Minimum Wage is 
essential not only for equity but as an important component of New Zealand's economic 
recovery (Brosnan and Wilkinson, 1989). We do not propose to repeat those arguments 
here but rather to present a case study of one of the lower paid industries: contract 
cleaning. 
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Although contract cleaning is far from the lowest paid industry (Brosnan and 
Wilkinson, 1989, Table 8), this case study is especially pertinent for three reasons: (a) 
contract cleaning is a highly profitable industry whose profitability is based almost 
entirely on low pay; (b) the study shows that low pay is not confined to small inefficient 
firms using obsolete technologies - the classic sweatshop - but is increasingly the 
province of large multinational companies; (c) the study also shows that low pay is not 
inevitable; moreover, that a strong, well organised trade union, in conjunction with the 
national award system, is sometimes able to achieve increases in pay, and without any 
loss of employment. 
The industry 
Contract cleaning is dominated by a handful of large companies: the Swedish-based 
Electrolux, Australian-based Berkeley Services, and Crothalls. Crothalls, which operates 
as Command, controls more than half of the market. However its market share is being 
eroded by Electrolux and some small, locally owned operators. Originally a New Zealand-
based firm, Crothalls spread to Australia, the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom. Crothalls pioneered the extension of contract cleaning into related services, 
such as hospital food preparation. In the United Kingdom, where the company at one 
stage held 90 percent of National Health Service cleaning work allocated to private 
contractors, it has attracted considerable attention on account of its exploitative practices. 
The most infamous was the Barking Hospital dispute when 90 women cleaners sustained 
an 18 month strike against the company. On the domestic front, it has aggressively 
swallowed competitors including Newco, Hygrade, Vacuum, Lloyds and Diamond White 
(Wellington) and extended its range of activities well beyond its base in contract cleaning 
to include building maintenance (Crothall Property Services), private hospital 
management (Comprehensive Australasian Retirement Enterprises, Health Care 
Management Consultants), security (Securitas), alarm systems (Monitor Controls), 
communication services (Seekers), catering and vending (Huntsbury Food Services, 
Advanced Food Systems and Synergetic systems). The Crothall empire was acquired in 
1980 by the United Kingdom-based Pritchard Group which, in tum, was taken over in 
June 1986 by the Hawley Group, a Bermuda-registered, United Kingdom-based 
multinational. Despite the wide range of its activities and its foreign ownership, 
Crothalls still poses as a modest, Christchurch family firm. 
The ownership of cleaning firms is constantly changing through mergers and takeovers 
and the changing maze of wholly owned subsidiaries allows the larger companies to 
submit several tenders for each new job by using the names of one of their acquired 
competitors. This constant changing of identities also serves another purpose in that it 
helps the contracting firms to escape previously acquired reputations for bad service. Thus 
Hawleys have now changed their name to ADT, originally the name of an American 
company they recently acquired. Their New Zealand arm, Crothalls, has changed its name 
to ADT Services (New Zealand) Ltd and has restructured into two sub-companies, Crothall 
Property Maintenance and United Health Serv. These companies in tum frequently submit 
tenders in the names of previously acquired competitors such as Hygrade or Lloyds. The 
concentration of ownership among the major companies is even greater since the 
Australian-based Berkeleys is owned by ADT (Hawleys). 
Despite its near monopolisation, the industry remains fiercely competitive. What is 
more, the low level of capital required for entry permits a substantial number of small, 
locally-based firms on the periphery of the industry. These firms can compete 
successfully with the major companies. For example, Avalon, a small Wellington 
company, recently won the Wellington and Hutt Hospitals' contracts from Crothalls. 
This competitive bidding for contracts means that profit margins are trimmed to 
between 1 and 5 percent of the contract price. However, high levels of turnover, and the 
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low capitalisation required by the industry, are able to yield very substantial rates of profit 
on capital deployed, typically 30 to 50 percent per annum - roughly twice as great as for 
New Zealand companies in general. 
Contract cleaning companies and privatisation 
Because the dominant firms in New Zealand are all foreign owned, they are not required 
to produce financial statements. However, the Hawley Group's total operation is a matter 
of public record in the United Kingdom. Ascher (1987) comments that the group 
increased its turnover tenfold between 1980 and 1984 and that Pritchard Services increased 
its business five times in the same period. A notable feature of the operation of these 
firms in the United Kingdom, aside from their extremely low wages, is their infiltration of 
government decision making processes: 
The strategy employed by the major contractors to gain a foothold in the 
public sector markets has been both simple and successful. Unlike the unions, 
who have devoted tremendous effort to mobilising public opinion, the 
contractors have directed their lobbying efforts almost exclusively at the 
political decision-makers, particularly those at national level. Their campaign 
has been low-key, often operating behind closed ministerial doors, and 
virtually invisible to those outside mainstream Conservative Party politics. 
Four aspects of this lobbying campaign are of particular interest: trade 
association activity, Conservative activists in service industries, direct 
lobbying of Parliament, and corporate links with the Conservative Party 
(Ascher, 1987, p. 72). 
We can only guess at the range of tactics employed by their New Zealand subsidiaries. 
Certainly, they have been active, along with Electrolux, in lobbying for the further 
privatisation of Government services, especially in the health area and in the cleaning of 
Government buildings. 
It seems, at the time of writing, that this push for privatisation will be successful. 
The Government's motivation is to obtain what Kate Ascher euphemistically called 
"efficiency improvements" which: 
... can only be achieved by reducing staff, lowering conditions of service, and 
instituting more flexible working arrangements. All three actions clearly 
undermine the position of both ... workers and their trade unions. 
Competitive tendering can be thought of as a zero-sum game, in which the 
Government and the ... trade unions are the players: the greater the efficiency 
savings, the more dramatic the effect upon union members (Ascher, 1987, 
p.97). 
Crothalls have also made a determined effort to move into the cleaning of state schools 
and have set up a subsidiary, Schoolcare Services Ltd., especially for that purpose. As the 
law stands at present, school committees are required to use the money they receive for 
cleaners' wages to employ cleaners directly. Contract cleaning companies, however, 
approach school committees and offer a cleaning contract. To make this attractive, despite 
its illegality, they offer "kickbacks" to the school, as they do to hospitals, with the size of 
the kickback related to the level of costs savings achieved 1. In their approach to schools, 
they state explicitly that the cost savings "can only be achieved through the reduction of 
These kickbacks are usually in the form of an annual cash refund of half the cost saving. 
Sometimes it is in the form of a grant for sports equipment. 
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staff levels" .2 What they fail to add is that the existing cleaning staff will need to be laid 
off and rehired or that they may be replaced by school children. In the most cynical case, 
the companies offer to provide "training" as "work preparation" for less able pupils.3 
Thus the cleaning is done by these pupils as part of the school curriculum. 
The result is a low standard of cleaning in the contracted schools with consequent 
disruption to the school routine and with teachers and pupils being forced to do some 
cleaning so that classrooms can operate effectively.4 The contract cleaning companies are 
endeavouring to have the law changed so that their school cleaning contracts (about 10 
percent of schools) can be legitimized and so they can take over related activities such as 
school caretaking, catering, security and ground maintenance. 
The vulnerability of contract cleaning companies 
The nature of contract cleaning with its high rates of profit on a limited capital base 
makes it an attractive avenue for investment by New Zealand and foreign-based firms. But 
the limited capital requirements make entry to the industry relatively easy. The low profit 
margins which ensue make employers in the industry particularly vulnerable. A strike of 
only one or two weeks may succeed in wiping out the annual profit on a contract. What 
is more, the source of additional profits, reducing staffing, and its consequence, reduced 
standards of service, are easily visible and unions can sometimes exploit this politically. 
Thus it is no surprise to find that Hawleys and their Pritchard subsidiary ruthlessly 
suppress unions in the United Kingdom.5 
The two unions which represent cleaners in New Zealand6 are both well organised and 
have attempted to exploit the strategic weaknesses of the contract cleaning companies and 
negotiate better levels of pay for their members. Nonetheless, they confront severe 
organisational difficulties due to the nature of the industry with its diffusion of 
workplaces. Their strength owes much to the national award system and compulsory 
unionism. The former guarantees a common set of minimum wages and conditions 
throughout the industry thus ruling out wage cutting as a means of improving contracts. 
Compulsory unionism strengthens the union financially and prevents employers using 
non-union labour. 
The contract cleaners' dispute 1984-1986 
The ability of the cleaners' union to achieve wage increases and the importance of the 
arbitration system is demonstrated by the 30 percent increase won by private sector 
cleaners in 1986. This increase had a lengthy historical origin. Until 1979, school 
cleaners and private sector cleaners had received the same pay rates. In that year, the union 
argued for external comparability before the Public Sector Tribunal and school cleaners 
were granted the same rate as cleaners employed by the Department of Internal Affairs. 
They then sought the same rate for school cleaners employed by private sector contractors. 
2 Copy of correspondence held by the first author. 
3 Interviews with teachers. 
4 Interviews with teachers. 
5 See for example Landor (1986). 
6 The New Zealand Cleaners, Caretakers and Security Officers Federation, and The New 
Zealand Federated Hospital, Restaurant and Related Trades Employees Industrial 
Association of Workers. Now amalgamated as the Service Workers Federation of 
Aotearoa. 
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In 1981, strikes, centred on only two schools, resulted in private contractors agreeing 
to pay the higher rate to their school cleaners. During the wage freeze, an exemption to 
the freeze was sought by the union but employers refused. Cleaners went out on strike 
and a concerted picketing campaign was centred on Crothalls and the cleaning at BP 
House. The dispute was highly successful from a union point of view. The 24 hour 
pickets at BP House, the widely reported management and police violence (Roth, 1984, 
p.140), plus publicity about the low rates of pay for what most people regarded as a 
difficult and dirty job, won the union widespread support from the public and from other 
unions. The strike clearly hurt the company and Pritchard's Annual Report for 1984 
commented on the "squeezed margins" (page 5) in New Zealand. After a month, 
management agreed to the union's demand. 
But actually achieving parity took two years more. The Arbitration Court granted 
parity in the 1985 award but the school cleaners award had not been settled and they moved 
ahead again. However, the Court granted a longer term award to private sector cleaners; 
thus the schools' agreement would be settled first in 1986. That year, however, the 
cleaning contractors initially refused to negotiate on the school cleaners agreements 
because of the by now virtually automatic flow on to the private sector award. Eventually 
the school contract cleaners agreement was settled at 21.5 percent. The private sector 
award was then settled in the Arbitration Court and private sector cleaners gained parity 
with a 30.1 percent increase. In granting the award, the Chief Judge commented that he 
found it "strange indeed" that employers offered only $6.00 per hour when they previously 
had agreed to pay school cleaners $6.83 per hour and that "to have varying rates ... is 
absurd" (Book of Awards, 1986, p. 2475). 
While the union was successful on this occasion, it must be noted that the 30 percent 
pay increase took seven years to achieve. Although strike action was successful and 
played a major role, the increase also owed much to the national award system. 
The unions have had other victories. A strike at Auckland hospital by the Hotel, 
Hospital and Restaurant Union, in 1983, led to the Hospital Board directing the 
contractors to take on more full time staff (Roth, 1984, p. 143). The union had cleaners 
elected to the Auckland Hospital Board in 1986 and the Board subsequently changed two 
hospitals from using Crothalls (Command) to "self cleaning" systems (Dominion, 26 
January 1988). Despite this, the future for the workers in the industry is less than bright. 
The cleaning unions face further battles as the Government weakens the award system and 
pursues its plans for further privatisation of public services. 
The source of profits in the industry 
The key to understanding the economics of contract cleaning is its inherent labour 
intensity, with few opportunities for increasing labour productivity by capital investment 
or innovation. Consequently, the surplus for the profitable operation of private capital is 
essentially obtained by using less labour, i.e. lowering existing standards, and by an 
intensification of the labour employed. This can only be achieved by lowering wages or 
worsening conditions of employment. The scope for these, especially the former, are 
limited in New Zealand because of the national award system. Nonetheless, contract 
cleaning companies do attempt to achieve "savings" in this way. This is most obvious 
where they reduce the number of hours or number of cleaners allocated to a given task. 
Less obvious forms are: the casualisation of formerly full-time jobs; provision not being 
made for sickness or other absences, thus other cleaners and/or supervisors have to do the 
work of absent workers; damaged or broken equipment being provided thus putting the 
onus on workers to use more exhausting and time consuming manual methods. 
Unscrupulous contractors go to inordinate lengths to cut costs in these ways. For 
example, if a worker employed for 30 hours per week, six hours per day, is replaced with 
two workers whose combined hours are 30 per week, but each is only working 3 hours per 
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day, this removes the employer's obligation to provide a teabreak. This has three 
advantages for the contractor. First, there is a saving in not having to provide 
refreshments. Second, workers are less likely to meet each other, thus making union 
organisation more difficult. Finally, there is a higher degree of productivity to be obtained 
from a second worker doing the remaining three hours, as compared with the one working 
the full six hours (who in fact does less than six hours work because of the teabreak). 
The impact of the creation of these profitable opportunities has been twofold. First, 
the ease of entry and ensuing fierce competition has led to very low tenders- motivated 
both by intense competition and also by the need for firms to establish a base in the 
industry from which more profitable contracts could be secured in the future - and 
consequential well documented instances of low standards of service.? The second effect is 
that the more successful companies have grown mainly by acquisition and they, in tum, 
have been swallowed by overseas companies engaging in the same tactics. The Hawley 
Group and Pritchard Services which acquired Crothalls stand out for special mention: 
Both these companies have engaged in acquisition behaviour on an 
unprecedented scale. This thirst for acquisition can be attributed to the nature 
of their core business - contract cleaning. Its low capital demands ensure 
good cash-flow prospects, and pave the way for the continual purchase of 
smaller companies needed to round out geographical or functional portfolios 
(Ascher, p. 91). 
Behind the facade of financial jargon lies a simpler story. These companies are 
deploying their surplus generated from the low pay and poor working conditions of their 
employees in order to increasingly dominate the industry. From this base, they can, in 
the future, improve the contract price and their profit margins. The economic costs of this 
process are borne by the rest of society. Aside from the disincentives to efficiency which 
low pay generates (Brosnan and Wilkinson, 1989), there are other severe costs to the 
workers and to the State which subsidises the workers' low pay through Family Support 
and other welfare payments. To the extent that these large corporations return their 
surplus to their home countries, the balance of payments deteriorates. Finally, there is the 
cost to the community of the monopolisation of service provision in fewer and fewer 
hands over which it has no democratic control. 
Conclusion 
The present political climate is a most favourable environment for contract cleaning 
companies. The government's drive to contracting out and to privatisation, if it 
continues, will expand the range of activities available to these companies; not just in 
cleaning but in a range of related services such as catering and security work. This will 
not however produce additional jobs since workers will be displaced from jobs in the 
public sector. In fact, employment in the industry is bound to be lower as the 
competitive tendering process produces lower bids for contracts and costs are trimmed by 
economising in the use of labour. The workers in the industry will thus bear the brunt of 
this drive to privatisation and contracting out as the number of jobs is reduced and those 
that remain are intensified. 
In this environment, which also produces a downward pressure on wage rates, effective 
unionism is essential. The two unions which deal with contract cleaners have been 
7 An adage in the industry is that "you make money not from what you do but from what 
you don't do". For examples of the reduced standards of service provided by contract 
cleaners in hospitals, see Mullins (1987) and for a comparison with the behaviour of the 
same companies in the UK see Coyle (1986). 
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successful so far in maintaining pay rates and their recent federation should improve their 
effectiveness further. They may however face severe difficulties in the future. The nature 
of contract cleaning work with its workforce fragmented by location and hours, makes 
effective organisation extremely difficult. Much of the success of the two unions in the 
industry is directly attributable to two features of the New Zealand industrial relations 
system which overcome these organisational difficulties; namely, compulsory unionism 
and the blanket coverage provision of the national award system. The difficulties of 
organisation in systems without these provisions and the consequent low pay and 
appalling conditions is well described by Coyle (1986). The continued ability of the 
cleaning unions to maintain pay at reasonable levels and prevent further deterioration in 
working conditions will depend to a considerable extent on these features of the system 
being retained in the future. 
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